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In this paper we investigate whether a monopoly in a vertically differentiated market may
have the incentive to adopt a multi-product strategy if the consumers are concerned by the
other consumers' choices. We use a variant of the Mussa and Rosen model where the utility
of a consumer is positively or negatively affected by her relative standing i.e how high or low
is the quality she chooses with respect to the other consumers' choices. We prove that a
multi-product strategy may be adopted by the monopoly if the consumers' social distinction
desire is strong enough.
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It is now well recognized that the pleasure of consuming one good may be aected by
the consumption choice of other consumers. Let us consider a consumer planning to
buy a car or a mobile phone. If she buys the highest quality oered in the market then
in addition to the traditional satisfaction derived from the intrinsic characteristics of
the product, she derives a positive satisfaction from consuming the best quality oered
in the market. Inversely, if she does not buy the highest quality then the consumer
loses some satisfaction because she does not consume the best quality in the market
when other consumers do. Such behavior is referred to in the literature as search
for "prestige" or "status" or "social distinction". The quality chosen by a consumer
signals her social rank and the consumers' relative preferences for quality aect their
satisfaction. A consumer may be interested by a good because of her relative standing
when consuming this good.
In this paper, we consider a vertically dierentiated market. We investigate whether
relative preferences for quality may favor multi-product strategies. More precisely, we
examine whether it is protable for a monopoly to oer more than one quality of her
product when the consumers' relative preferences for quality aect either positively or
negatively their utility depending on their quality choice relative to the choice of the
other consumers.
Relative preferences were rst formally modeled by Duesenberry (1949) who de-
scribed several examples of interdependence in consumer consumption behavior. Ak-
erlof (1997) proved that the satisfaction of a consumer increases with the dierence
between her personal status and others' status. Alexopoulus and Sapp (2006) as well
as Riechmann (2006) found that rms with relative preferences can aect the outcomes
predicted by the standard Cournot and Stackelberg models. In Ben Elhadj (2007), it
was proved that when taking into account the consumers' relative preferences for qual-
ity, the strategic behavior of a duopoly in a vertically dierentiated market is aected.
In the case of a monopoly in a vertically dierentiated market, two factors may
explain a multi-product strategy: quality costs and income disparities1 .
Acharyya(1998) demonstrated that if the cost function is suciently convex in
quality the monopoly oers a separating menu: a dierent quality for each type of
consumers. Acharyya (1998) also proved that the standard parametrization of costs
and preferences observed in the literature: linear utilities with respect to price and
quality and constant marginal cost of quality, can not generate a separating menu.
Kim and Kim (1996) showed that due to cost spillover-eects, a monopoly operating
in a vertically dierentiated market facing a discrete consumers distribution can reduce
total costs of production and increase her prot by jointly producing two products.
1Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006) proved that deterring entry is not a factor that can favor
the adoption of a multi-product strategy.
1Acharyya (2005) proved, in a model where the consumers' distribution is discrete,
that the constraining eect of income by itself make quality discrimination protable
for a monopoly. Bonnisseau and Ghazzai(2005) determined conditions under which
the monopoly adopts a multi-product strategy when consumers are continuously dis-
tributed with respect to their intensities of preference for quality and incomes. Quality
discrimination is protable because of income disparities.
Gabszewicz et al. (1986) addressed the same issue considering another vertical dif-
ferentiation model where consumers dier by their willingness to pay and where this
willingness to pay has in the same time a constraining eect (a consumer cannot pur-
chase at a price exceeding her willingness to pay) and a utility eect (richer consumers
derive higher utility from consumption than do poorer consumers). They showed that
it is protable for the monopolist to produce the maximal number of products when
the market is suciently large. These results together with those of Acharyya (2005)
highlight the role of the dierence in income in the emergence of multiproduct strate-
gies.
We prove in this paper that introducing consumers' relative preferences may lead
to multi-product strategies under some conditions on the consumers' distribution and
their social desire distinction. Thus, in addition to quality costs and income disparities,
relative preferences for quality explain quality discrimination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model.
In section 3, we give necessary and sucient conditions for the monopoly to adopt a
multi-product strategy. We conclude in section 4.
2 The model
We consider a vertical dierentiation model with relative preferences for quality. The
market is monopolized by one rm which can produce dierent qualities of the same
good chosen from the segment [0;q].
The production is costless. We choose a costless production to prove that the
monopoly may adopt a multi-product strategy only because of the relative preferences
for quality. With costless production and when consumers are not income constrained,
a multi-product strategy is never protable for the monopoly whatever is the distribu-
tion of the consumers as shown by Acharyya (1998).
There are two types of consumers characterized by their intensity of preference for
quality. We consider n1 consumers with low preference for qualities characterized by 1
and n2 consumers with high preference for quality characterized by 2 with 2 > 1 > 0.
Each consumer is supposed to buy at most one quality from the qualities oered by
the monopoly. The quality purchased is the one that ensures to her the highest utility
except if the consumer is better when making no purchase.
Because we only consider two types of consumers, the monopoly will oer at most two
2qualities q1 and q2 with q2 > q1. The indirect utility of a consumer is then given by:
Ui =

 pi + iqi + (qi   qj) if she buys quality qi
0 if she buys neither quality
with i = 1;2; j = 1;2 and i 6= j.
The utility function of a consumer is given by the standard utility function in a
vertically dierentiated market introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) to which we
add a term ((qi   qj)) relative to the relative preferences for quality of consumers 2.
If (qi qj) is positive (qi > qj), the utility of a consumer is positively aected because
she is consuming a higher quality than the other quality available in the market. If
(qi   qj) is negative(qi < qj), the utility of a consumer is negatively aected because
she is consuming a lower quality than the other quality available in the market.  may
be interpreted as the social distinction desire.  is positive and the larger is , the
more important is the impact of relative preferences in the satisfaction of consumers.
By her choice of prices and qualities: p1, p2, q1 and q2, the monopoly objective is to
maximize her prot. The monopoly can choose a separating menu by oering dierent
price-quality combinations to dierent consumers'types or the monopoly can choose to
oer only one quality. When oering only one quality, the monopoly can either cover
the whole market or cater for only the high-type consumers. In the next section, we
provide the conditions under which the monopoly has a multi-product strategy i.e the
monopoly oers a separating menu to the consumers.
3 The Monopoly Strategy
In this section, we assume rst that the monopoly is oering a separating menu to
the consumers. We nd the necessary conditions for the monopoly to adopt a multi-
product strategy. Then, we compare the monopoly's prot when she oers two qualities
to her prot when she oers only one quality.
The monopoly's problem, when oering a separating menu, is the following:
max = n1p1 + n2p2 (s.t) 8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0  p1  1q1 + (q1   q2) (1)
0  p2  2q2 + (q2   q1) (2)
1 
p2 p1
q2 q1   2 (3)
2 
p2 p1
q2 q1   2 (4)
Condition (1) implies that type-1 consumers prefer buying the quality q1 than making
no purchase.
Condition (2) implies that type-2 consumers prefer buying the quality q2 than making
2as in Ben Elhadj (2007)
3no purchase.
Condition (3) means that type-1 consumers prefer q1 to q2.
Condition (4) means that type-2 consumers prefer q2 to q1.
With the four conditions cited above, we ensure that the market is covered and that
the monopoly is oering a separating menu. The quality q1 is purchased by type-1
consumers and the quality q2 is purchased by type-2 consumers. Thus, the market is
ordered as in the standard Mussa and Rosen Model. Consumers with low intensity of
preference for quality buy the low quality. Consumers with high intensity of preference
for quality buy the high quality 3.
Solving the monopoly's problem is equivalent to consider a two-step game where the
monopoly chooses her qualities rst and then xes the prices. By Lemma 1, we give
a rst necessary condition that must be satised by the qualities for the existence of
a separating menu. The low quality q1 must be high enough with respect to the high
quality q2 to be purchased by the consumers.
Lemma 1 A necessary condition to oer a separating menu is q1 

+1q2.
Proof. Immediate. If q1 <

+1q2, condition (1) in the prot maximization problem
is never satised and the prot maximization problem has no solution.
If the condition stated in Lemma 1 is not satised, type-1 consumers are better
making no purchase. The quality oered to them is too low with respect to the quality
oered to type-2 consumers. The existence of relative preferences prevent them from
buying the lowest quality even if oered at a null price.
Assuming that q1 

+1q2, we represent in Figure 1 by the shaded area all the
prices p1 and p2 that satisfy conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4).
3 p2 p1
q2 q1   2 in conditions (3) and (4) is the intensity of preference for quality of a consumer
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Figure 1: Prices satisfying conditions (1) to (4)
As the monopoly's prot is linear with respect to p1 and p2, we easily deduce from
Figure 1 the optimal prices as functions of q1 and q2. They correspond to the maximal
prices p1 and p2 belonging to the shaded area. Thus, we have:
p1(q1;q2) = 1q1 + (q1   q2)
p2(q1;q2) = 1q1 + ( + 2)(q2   q1)
In maximizing the monopoly's prot, we can notice that consumers with low pref-
erence for quality have no surplus. All type-1 consumers are indierent between
purchasing q1 and not purchasing. Condition (1) is binding for these consumers. Con-
dition (4) is binding for type-2 consumers which are indierent from purchasing q2 or
q1. Type-2 consumers have a positive surplus as they are charged a price lower than
their reservation price 2q2 + (q2   q1). 4 This ensures that type-2 consumers will
not mimic type-1 consumers and will buy exactly the quality targeted at them.
Replacing in the monopoly's prot p1 and p2 by their optimal values, we obtain the
following reduced form of the prot:
(q1;q2) = (n11 + n1   n2   n2(2   1))q1 + ( n1 + n22 + n2)q2.
It is straightforward to check that the prot is increasing in q2 if
n1
n2  1 +
2
 and




+1 . Thus, a second necessary condition for a separating
menu to exist is given by Lemma 2.
4Let us compare the reservation price of type-2 consumers p2 = 2q2+(q2 q1) when the monopoly
oer only one quality of type-2 consumers to the optimal price p2 = 1q1 + ( + 2)(q2   q1) when
the monopoly oer two qualities. [2q2 + (q2   q1)]   [1q1 + ( + 2)(q2   q1)] = (2   1)q1 > 0














We can easily check that
+2 1
+1 < 1 +
2
 .
We deduce from Lemmas 1 and 2 that if a separating menu is oered, the optimal
prices and qualities are:
p









Oering a positive quality q1 at a null price means that the monopoly does not have
any additional prot from type-1 consumers. However, oering two qualities instead
of one enables a priori the monopoly to set a higher price for the quality q2 than when
she oers only one quality as the willingness to pay of type-2 consumers is higher. In
fact, type-2 consumers have an additional utility resulting from their consumption of
the best quality oered in the market.
The quality oered to type-1 consumers is the lowest quality that satises Lemma
1. Type-1 are not willing to purchase a lower quality than this one.
Let us now compare the monopoly's prot when she oers a separating menu to
her prot when she oers only one quality. The monopoly can choose between two
strategies:
1. Oer one quality for the two types of consumers.
2. Oer one quality for the type-2 consumers.
When only one quality is oered the relative preferences for quality do not exist
anymore. The utility function is given then by the standard utility function 5.
If the monopoly oers one quality and covers all the market, the optimal price and
quality are p = 1q and q = q. The maximal price the monopoly can x is the
reservation price of type-1 consumers p = 1q1. The monopoly's prot is maximized
when she produces the highest possible quality. From straightforward calculations, we
can check that if the condition of Lemma 2 is satised, it is more protable for the





the monopoly's strategy consisting in oering one quality to all consumers is always
dominated by the multi-product strategy.
5When the monopoly oers only one quality, the utility of a consumer is given by:
Ui =

 pi + iqi if she buys quality qi
0 if she buys neither quality
with i = 1;2.
6If the monopoly oers one quality for the type-2 consumers, the optimal price and
quality are p = 2q and q = q. The maximal price the monopoly can x is the
reservation price of type-2 consumers p = 2q2. The monopoly's prot is maximized
when she produces the highest possible quality. From straightforward calculations,
we can check that if the condition 2 < 21 is satised, it is more protable for the
monopoly to oer a separating menu. In fact, when oering a separating menu, the
monopoly has no additional prot from serving type-1 consumers but the price she
sets is higher than when she only caters for type-2 consumers if 2 < 21. Therefore,
Proposition 1 The optimal strategy for the monopoly is to oer a separating menu if
and only if  
n11 n2(2 1)





+1 and 2 < 21 imply
n1
n2  1 +
2 21
+1 < 1. Thus,
n1 < n2 and  
n11 n2(2 1)
n2 n1 .
Under some conditions on the consumers' intensity of preference for quality and
their social distinction desire, we prove that the optimal monopoly strategy is to oer
two qualities. In fact, the consumers' social distinction desire must be strong enough to
justify a multi-product strategy. When the monopoly oers a separating menu, she has
no additional prot from type-1 consumers. The only reason for oering a separating
menu is that the monopoly can charge a higher price to type-2 consumers than when
she oers the same quality for all the consumers. The additional prot she obtains
from type-2 consumers (when oering a separating menu) compensates the prot she
has from type-1 consumers when she oers the same quality for all if the consumers'
social distinction desire is strong enough.
We can also notice that if the intensity of preference for quality of type-2 consumers
is too high with respect to the intensity of preference for quality of type-1 consumers
(2  21). The monopoly is better catering only for type-2 consumers. The price she
can x for the high quality in this case (p2 = 2q) is greater than the price xed when
oering a separating menu.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the optimal strategy for a monopoly when relative
preferences for quality exist. Even when the production is costless and even if the
consumers are not income constrained, a multi-product strategy is protable for the
monopoly when some conditions on the consumers' intensity of preference for quality
and their social distinction desire are satised.
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